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Note
GENERAL WELFARE AND "NO-GROWTH"
ZONING PLANS: CONSIDERATION OF
REGIONAL NEEDS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES
No-growth zoning schemes have been employed by municipalities desiring
to exclude new residents. In Construction Industry Association v. City of
Petaluma, the Ninth Circuit rejected the regional approach of the district court
and adopted a municipal general welfare analysis like that in Golden v. Planning
Board of Ramapo. The author analyzes the alternatives open to the Ninth
Circuit and concludes that courts must employ a regional general welfare analy-
sis to protect regional residents who are otherwise unrepresented.
I. INTRODUCTION
UDICIAL REACTIONS to municipal efforts to avoid growth have
been mixed; no consistent manner of examining the validity of
"no-growth" plans has emerged. In Construction Industry Associ-
ation v. City of Petaluma,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit chose to permit a municipality to avoid population
expansion by limiting the number of new housing units that may be
built in the city in any one year. Substantial case law supports this
result,2 but more persuasive case law exists which would require that
a municipality accept growth in light of regional demand for hous-
ing.3 The district court opinion in Construction Industry Association
v. City of Petaluma4 and the New York Court of Appeals decision
in Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo5 represent the two con-
1. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. See notes 50-70 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 27-49 infra and accompanying text.
4. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974). See Landman, No, Mr. Bosselman, The Town of Ramapo Cannot Pass a Law
to Bind the Rights of the Whole World: A Reply, 10 TULSA L.J. 169 (1974); Smith,
Does Petaluma Lie at the End of the Road from Ramapo?, 19 VILL. L. RaV. 739
(1974); Note, The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J.
LEGIs. 244 (1975); Note, The Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 849 (1974); Note, Construction Industry Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma: The Petaluma
Plan to Control Urban Population Growth, 2 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 318 (1974); Note,
Land Use Controls: Is There a Place for Everything?, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 607 (1974);
Note, The Reconciliation of Land Use Laws and the Right to Travel. Toward a
Realistic Standard of Judicial Review, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 575 (1974); 5
CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 543 (1975); 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 137 (1974); 9
GA. L. REV. 260 (1974); 51 N.D.L. REV. 509 (1974); 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 128 (1975);
6 SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (1974); 28 VAND. L. REV. 430 (1975).
5. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law
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flicting judicial positions which were available to the Ninth Circuit.
The tension between these two analyses stems from their underlying
disagreement on the proper scope of the population unit whose gen-
eral welfare is to be served by municipal zoning ordinances.
Both Petaluma, California, a suburb of San Francisco, and Ram-
apo, New York, a suburb of New York City, faced what they con-
sidered to be an undesirably rapid rate of population growth.
Both wanted to control growth and adopted long-range zoning plans
that served to place artificial restrictions on the natural population
expansion of the communities. The details of the respective plans
were different but the effect of each was to exclude potential resi-
dents seeking housing in the municipality. The plans reflected the
municipalities' desire to avoid absorbing their proportionate share of
regional growth.
The two plans initially met with different judicial reactions. The
Court of Appeals of New York interpreted the general welfare ele-
ment of the test in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.6 to mean
local general welfare and found that the State's zoning enabling
legislation empowered the local authorities to zone for the sole
benefit of the municipality. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California read general welfare to mean
regional general welfare and held that a municipality cannot con-
sider only its own welfare in promulgating zoning ordinances. The
municipality was instead required to consider the needs and re-
sources of the geographic region in which it was located. But this
interpretation was rejected on appeal by the Ninth Circuit, which
tested the validity of the Petaluma plan against the Ramapo model.
Under that test, the plan was found to serve the general welfare and
was upheld.
This Note suggests that a careful analysis of general welfare re-
quires judicial encouragement of the consideration of regional prob-
lems in local zoning. It is further suggested that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach, which allows municipalities to zone for parochial and
selfish interests, is not the best solution. A discussion of judicial
to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REv. 234 (1973); Editor's
Comments, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New Dimension in American
Planning Law, 4 URBAN LAWYER ix (1972); Note, Golden v. Planning Board: TIme
Phased Development Control Through Zoning Standards, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 142
(1973); Comment, Time Control, Sequential Zoning: The Ramapo Case, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 318 (1973); Note, A Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo Township's
Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723 (1972); Note,
Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974); 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 516 (1973).
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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efforts to define the community for whose general welfare local zon-
ing ordinances are passed and an examination of the alternatives
open to the court of appeals indicates that the approach urged by
the district court is indeed more appropriate for dealing with con-
temporary land use problems.
II. No-GROWTH PLANS
The broad parameters of the zoning power of local governments
were established by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co. In Euclid, the Court employed a rather minimal
test of constitutional validity, upholding a municipal zoning ordi-
nance in the face of a general attack that it deprived a landowner
of liberty and property without due process of law. The Village had
the power to adopt the ordinance because it had a "substantial re-
lation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."7 The
Court anticipated the approach of the district court in Petaluma
when it added that "[iut is not meant by this, however, to exclude
the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so
far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality
would not be allowed to stand in the way.",8 It has been difficult for
courts to determine from the Euclid decision exactly what elements
of the zoning and land use regulation process may be used to serve
the general welfare, and after five decades, general welfare in the
zoning context remains undefined.9 That these difficulties arose is
not surprising, for the Court in Euclid deliberately avoided the es-
tablishment of a detailed test which might hamstring the exercise
of zoning power in the future. The Court noted that new condi-
tions, yet unforeseen, would require new applications of the zoning
power.'0
With the increased urbanization following World War II, several
courts recognized that those new conditions had arisen. In the con-
comitant reassessment of the power to zone, the judiciary defined
the general welfare element of the Euclid test broadly. Opinions
written in the period from 1945 to 1970 indicate that some juris-
dictions" favored requiring that local zoning authorities consider
the impact of their land use decisions on the region in which the
7. Id. at 395.
8. Id. at 390.
9. Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA
L. Rav. 367 (1965).
10. 272 U.S. at 387.
11. Notably New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See text accompanying notes 27-
42 and notes 43-48 infra.
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municipality was located. If the municipalities were to attempt to
justify their zoning ordinances under the Euclid general welfare
rationale, then they had to demonstrate consideration of general wel-
fare in a broad sense when the ordinance was adopted. The mu-
nicipality could not view itself as a self-contained community be-
cause it was part of the "economic and social whole" and would
have to temper its actions in order to avoid harming neighboring
communities.'
2
During the 1970's, in apparent response to an undesirably rapid
rate of local population growth, a number of communities in the
United States passed ordinances which put a ceiling on local popu-
lation by restraining residential construction. These ordinances
have been given the generic title of "no-growth" plans.'
3
The use of "no-growth" plans did not raise issues involved in
the consideration of such restraints as minimum lot size, minimum
floor space, and permit rationing. Residential suburbs of major
urban centers used these restraint techniques to prevent the influx
of undesired racial and ethnic minorities by keeping the cost of
suburban housing high. Housing, for example, was kept sufficiently
expensive to exclude most individuals desiring to move from city to
suburb. Inasmuch as these exclusionary plans focused on readily
discernable groups the schemes were vulnerable to attack as a denial
of equal protection.
No-growth plans did not pose the same constitutional objections.
Although one effect of a no-growth plan might be to raise the price
of existing housing and thereby prevent low income minorities from
obtaining housing in the community, the no-growth plan was not
discriminatory since all potential newcomers were excluded. The
only new residents of a no-growth community would be replace-
ments for those existing residents who had left the municipality.
Because no identifiable suspect category is excluded under such a
plan, an equal protection analysis is inapplicable. Yet a prolifera-
tion of no-growth plans within a housing region would decrease the
availability of housing to all elements of the population. A general
welfare analysis might proscribe such plans14 if the appropriate
parties could raise their objections.1 5
12. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
13. See, e.g., New York Times, July 28, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
14. Most commentary on exclusionary zoning has dealt with the problem in an
equal protection context. These discussions have assumed, however, that the group
excluded was finite, discrete, and easily identified and that the excluding municipality
wanted to grow, albeit on its own terms. When the excluded group is not identifiable,
an equal protection attack is not appropriate. A general welfare analysis might fill
this gap, since zoning is required to serve the general welfare. It is arguable that the
[Vol. 26:215
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the general welfare elements16 of
the Petaluma plan required a balancing of the exclusionary elements
potential harm of no-growth plans, in terms of the size of the group affected, is greater
than the harm of earlier exclusionary techniques, as not only minorities but all people
seeking housing are likely to be injured. A general welfare analysis, which recog-
nizes this distinction, could therefore be used to invalidate no-growth plans without
recourse to a less reliable equal protection argument. See Sager, Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. RaV. 767 (1969);
Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and
Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971). See also articles cited at note 4 supra.
15. The Supreme Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975),
will have a significant impact on the ability of plaintiffs to bring suit against munici-
palities with exclusionary zoning schemes. In Warth, multiple plaintiffs sought to
invalidate the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York. The plaintiffs claimed that
the enforcement of the ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income
from housing in Penfield, in violation of their constitutional rights and their rights
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983. The Rochester Home Builders Association
was denied the right to intervene as a party plaintiff. The district court dismissed
the action as to all plaintiffs for lack of standing, (opinion not reported), and the court
of appeals affirmed. 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals in a 5-4 decision.
For the Court, Justice Powell wrote that the Rochester Home Builders Associa-
tion would be a proper party to assert the rights of all its members. The Associa-
tion's claim was that the restrictive zoning ordinance had "deprived some of its mem-
bers of 'substantial business opportunities and profits'." 95 S. Ct. at 2213. The
Court concluded that the Association as a unit had alleged no injury, nor had any of
its members assigned their claims to it. Also, the damages claimed were found to be
"not common to the entire membership nor shared by all in equal degree." Id. at
2214. It was found that the Association failed to allege facts sufficient to make out a
case or controversy had the individual members themselves brought suit. Therefore,
the Association was denied standing as a representative of these parties. The other
petitioners, all nonresidents of Penfield, were denied standing for failing to allege
concrete, specific injuries and for presenting generalized grievances for judicial reso-
lution.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice White and
Mr. Justice Marshall joined, criticized the Court's decision for its effect of denying
the power to litigate zoning questions to the parties with sufficient economic incentive
to pursue the case to resolution. He characterized the Court's opinion as restricting
standing in zoning cases to residents of the zoned political unit. Since the Penfield
zoning scheme had effectively excluded the petitioners, the scheme remained in-
vulnerable:
[The] Court turns the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional
scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation. In effect,
the Court tells the low-income minority and building company plaintiffs
that they will not be permitted to prove what they have alleged . . . because
they have not succeeded in breaching, before the suit was filed, the very
barriers which are the subject of the suit.
Id. at 2217.
Under the standards described in Warth, any landowner in the zoned municipality
would have standing. The difficulty, of course, is in finding a landowner in an ex-
clusionary community whose interests would be served by lowering the barrier
created by existing zoning legislation and practices.
16. For a description of the plan see notes 96-99 infra and accompanying text.
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of the land use plan against a legitimate state interest. If the plan
bore a rational relationship to some such interest, the court would
have to defer to the legislative determination. 7  Writing for the
court, Judge Choy suggested that practically all zoning legislation
has some exclusionary effect, but the effect is not fatal if the munic-
ipality can show some legitimate interest.
Much of the court's critique of the Petaluma plan rested on its
interpretations of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas8 and Ybarra v.
City of Los Altos Hills.19 Both cases dealt with zoning regulations
which had the purpose and effect of permanently restricting growth.
In each of the cases the regulations were upheld because they served
a legitimate governmental interest within the concept of the general
welfare.20 The court quoted a passage from Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion in Belle Terre in which the Justice concluded
that the restriction of uncontrolled growth was a proper exercise of
the police power to protect the general welfare and that municipal
zoning authorities should be allowed substantial latitude. 2' In dis-
cussing Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills, the court emphasized the
need to consider the reasonableness of the ordinance under scrutiny,
but chose to evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinance only for
the city of Petaluma.22 In so doing, the court refused to recognize
that the effects of local zoning legislation do not stop at municipal
boundaries, that the test of reasonableness should not be limited to
the zoned political unit, and that the test of reasonableness can be
limited to the municipality only at the cost of diminished regional
general welfare. 23  In holding that the Petaluma plan does not dis-
criminate against any particular income or minority group, the
court ignored the burden placed on all the residents of the surround-
17. 522 F.2d at 906. The court's decision to defer to the legislature is consis-
tent with traditional judicial treatment of the question in zoning cases. See notes
57-58 infra and accompanying text; note 104 infra.
18. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The Supreme Court found a prohibition against multi-
family housing to be reasonable and within the public welfare. See notes 111-32
infra and accompanying text.
19. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). A large-lot zoning ordinance was challenged
for its discriminatory effects on low-income minorities. The court held that the
ordinance was rationally related to preserving the town's rural environment and did
not offend equal protection guaranties.
20. 522 F.2d at 907. In Belle Terre the interest was the preservation of quiet
family neighborhoods, while in Los Altos Hills the interest was the preservation of a
rural environment. Id.
21. Id. See notes 117-18 infra and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 908.
23. See notes 117-28 infra and accompanying text.
24. 522 F.2d at 908 n.16.
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ing region because their communities would have to absorb the
growth that Petaluma had avoided.25
The court concluded that "the concept of public welfare was
broad enough to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town
character, its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow
at an orderly and deliberate pace."26 In reaching this conclusion
the Ninth Circuit rejected the concept of regional general welfare
upon which the district court had invalidated Petaluma's insular
zoning plans. This clearly was not the only possible resolution of
the issues involved. Indeed, a careful consideration of the alterna-
tives available to the Ninth Circuit will reveal that the district
court's approach provides a more comprehensive vehicle for the
weighing of all the competing interests involved.
IV. CASE LAW REQUIRING OR ALLOWING
CONSIDERATION OF REGIONAL RESOURCES AND NEEDS
Substantial case law documents the development of the regional
approach to local zoning. Rational use of land in light of regional
resources and needs has been emphasized, while the significance of
political boundaries has been minimized.
For the past 25 years courts have sporadically encouraged local
zoning authorities to incorporate considerations of regional needs
and resources in the local planning process. The judiciary has em-
phasized the need for a thorough examination of the region and the
development of a plan of local land use which rationally comple-
mented uses throughout the region. 7  The courts advocating this
type of analysis were primarily concerned with the rational develop-
ment of the region; protection of municipal interests was second-
ary.28 The recognition that the political boundaries of a munici-
25. See notes 95-101 infra and accompanying text.
26. 522 F.2d at 908-09.
27. See Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347 (1949).
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends
not only on all the conditions . . . prevailing within the municipality and
its needs . . . but also on the nature of the entire region in which the
municipality is located and the use to which the land in that region has
been or may be put most advantageously. The effective development of a
region should not and cannot be made to depend on the adventitious loca-
tion of municipal boundaries.
Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50. The Duffcon opinion is significant as the first to
stress the importance of integrating regional needs and resources into the municipal
zoning decision.
28. Traditionally, courts have held that a locality need consider only the welfare
of the zoned unit in promulgating zoning ordinances. See Comment, Exclusionary
Zoning: An Overview, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1056 (1973).
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pality did not limit the effect of a zoning decision led some courts
to impose an "extraterritorial" responsibility on municipalities
when adopting local zoning legislation.29
However, this extraterritorial responsibility also operated to the
advantage of the municipality. For example, in encouraging ra-
tional land use planning as an alternative to the traditional scheme,
some courts concluded that if a region contained enough land zoned
for a particular use, an individual municipality need not zone more
land within its boundaries for the same use.30 In fact, it is note-
worthy that the early cases requiring or allowing municipalities to
consider regional resources did so to reach a result supporting a
municipality's exclusion of one use or another.3' In the later cases,
the same technique was turned about to force municipalities to make
provisions for an unwanted use.32
A series of Pennsylvania cases has been influential in the de-
velopment of a broader definition of general welfare in zoning law.
National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,33 Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc. ,34 and Appeal of Girsh35 all invalidated zoning schemes
adopted by municipalities to limit population growth and to preserve
a certain "character" for the community.
In National Land the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania identified
zoning laws as legitimate restrictions on an owner's constitutionally
29. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d
441 (1954). The party municipalities shared a border in a residential area. The
defendant changed its zoning from residential to business use. In holding that
municipal boundaries limited neither the effect nor the responsibility for the zoning
legislation the court found a duty
[to] hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may
be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much con-
sideration to their rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of
Dumont. To do less would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipal
boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning.
Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445-46. Two distinctions must be noted between the problem
in Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont and that raised in cases like Petaluma
and Ramapo. First, the land was already developed; the later cases involve problems
of future development. See text at page 246 infra. Second, the effect of the zoning
change on the nonresident was more pronounced because of the common boundary
and the immediate presence of the nonresident. In the later cases, the region and
the injured nonresidents are far less identifiable and immediate.
30. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
31. See Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347 (1949).
32. See text accompanying notes 42-49 infra.
33. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (minimum lot size invalid).
34. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (minimum lot size invalid).
35. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 39: (1970) (prohibition against building apartments
within city invalid).
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guaranteed right to the enjoyment of his property.36 Further, the
courts found that one of the legitimate exercises of the zoning
power was the control of population density by the use of minimum
lot zoning. However, the control of population density ceased to
be legitimate when the intent of the ordinance was to limit the flow of
new residents into the municipality.
37
The court noted that the exercise of zoning power to fulfill the
desire of many municipal residents to preserve the character of an
area did not adequately provide for the general welfare of the com-
munity. The court invalidated the zoning ordinance in question
which had as its primary purpose the exclusion of newcomers in
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the
administration of public services and facilities. It concluded that
the general welfare of any community is not fostered by a zoning
ordinance designed to be both exclusive and exclusionary. 8
Girsh and Kit-Mar applied the traditional Euclid test to exclu-
sionary zoning techniques. The consideration of injury to nonresi-
dents by the promulgation of municipal zoning ordinances was cru-
cial to the holding in Girsh. The Girsh court refused to defer to
local zoning authorities merely because the bare bones of the
Euclid test were met.39 Similarly, the Kit-Mar court held that any
zoning ordinance with an exclusionary purpose or result was unac-
ceptable.40  The court ruled that a community must deal with the
problems of frowth and cannot refuse to confront future develop-
ment by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict popula-
tion to near-present levels.41
The most difficult problems in this area arose as conflicts be-
tween a valid regional welfare argument and an equally valid local
welfare position. The local welfare argument was usually framed in
terms of overburdening the capacity of local public services; the re-
gional position usually focused on demand for housing.42
36. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
37. Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the future
-it may not be used as a means to deny the future ... [nor] to avoid the
increased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural
growth invariably bring.
Id. at 528, 215 A.2d 610.
38. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612. While the court uses the terms "local power"
and "local welfare" the result and general tone of the opinion reflect a careful con-
sideration of the broader problems with which zoning authorities must deal.
39. 437 Pa. 242, 263 A.2d 398 (1970).
40. 439 Pa. at 470, 268 A.2d at 766.
41. Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768.
42. Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687
(1965). The defendant township was zoned for minimum residential lots of 20,000
1975]
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Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison43 emphasized
regional welfare and drew together much of the previous thought on
regional concerns. The court recognized the shortage of housing in
the region and ruled that Madison could not artificially restrict
availability of housing in the community.
In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced commu-
nity, a municipality must not ignore housing needs, that
is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the hous-
ing needs of its own population and of the region. Hous-
ing needs are encompassed within the general welfare.
The Jeneral welfare does not stop at each municipal bound-
ary.
One of the plaintiff's arguments suggested that traditional purposes
of zoning, developed in a period of generally stable population
levels, were not controlling in a period of rapid population growth.45
Historically, a municipality could zone itself to maintain a given
population level, but current inadequate regional supplies of hous-
ing might make such zoning unacceptable. The court emphasized
the importance of favoring regional welfare when in conflict with
local welfare: "[T]he general welfare must not be circumvented or
flouted in municipal zoning., 46  The Madison decision interpreted
the zoning enabling statute to require municipalities to consider
regional housing needs to the extent that the general welfare includes
such needs. 47 The court found that Madison's plan of low-density
square feet. When challenged, the township argued that the goal of the zoning
ordinance was to maintain optimal elementary education facilities. The township
argued that if smaller lots were allowed, increased population density would result,
and existing schools would be overcrowded. While conceding that desirable housing
could be built on lots smaller than 20,000 square feet, the defendant argued that the
general welfare was served by the ordinance because the ordinance maintained
quality schools for residents. Plaintiff argued that regional housing needs were such
that the minimum lot scheme was exclusionary. The court found for the plaintiff.
See also Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 501, 176 N.W.2d 598,
600 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
43. 117 N.J. Super. II, 283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct., L. Div. 1971). The ordinance
under scrutiny established minimum lot sizes and minimum floorspace requirements
for single family dwellings. The court found these zoning restrictions to be un-
constitutional. It based its findings on a theory of zoning as a tool to attain a "bal-
anced community." Madison Township had actively attracted industry to locate in
the municipality, but had retained a zoning plan that made it difficult for the employees
of new local industry to purchase homes in the community.
44. Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
45. Id. at 15, 283 A.2d at 355.
46. Id. at 15-16, 283 A.2d at 355.
47. Planning is comprehended in this inherent right of sovereignty so to
order the affairs of the people as to serve the common essential need; and
zoning is an implementation of planning, concerned as it is with common
social and economic interests and needs encompassed by the basic power
[Vol. 26:215
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zoning did not contribute to the development of a reasonably bal-
anced community.
48
The line of cases which culminated in the Madison opinion re-
flected a judicial recognition that the traditional treatment of zon-
ing and land use problems, particularly in the area of housing, was
ineffective in a period of rapid population growth. The judicial
response to this new situation has recognized that the municipality
was an insufficiently comprehensive unit for effective zoning regula-
tion. The impact of municipal zoning was simply too widespread
to allow local zoning authorities to legislate without considering the
effect of legislation on people and towns outside the local unit.
This interpretation of the general welfare element of the Euclid validity
test indicated the willingness of some courts to discard old solu-
tions that did not fit new problems.4
V. CASE LAW CONSTRUING GENERAL
WELFARE IN STRICTLY LOCAL TERMS
The municipal power to zone for local benefits has been upheld
in a large number of cases through a literal reading of the police
powers of local governments and through judicial deference to
legislative discretion.
The cases which construed the general welfare provision of the
Euclid standard narrowly, i.e., as merely local general welfare,
rested on an analysis of zoning power as an element of the police
power. This analysis originated in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.5
of government to [make laws] "for the good and welfare of the common-
wealth, and all the subjects of the same."
Id. at 17, 283 A.2d at 356, quoting Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 408-09, 122 A.2d
506, 510 (1956).
48. Madison has been criticized because of its reliance on the "well bal-
anced community" standard. The standard is vague and, since it is useless for future
planning, tends to degenerate into a test of reasonableness. Comment, Zoning-
Municipal Corporations-General Welfare as a Zoning Purpose Held to Encompass
Local and Regional Housing Needs, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 401 (1973). The signifi-
cance of the decision is the requirement that municipalities that encourage the
growth of industry and jobs allow the development of housing for workers. The
application of the decision may be limited: "The decision leaves open the possibility
that a municipality which does not attract business or offer employment to a large
number of people may retain a more restricted residential zoning pattern." Id. at
415. See also 25 VAND. L. REv. 466 (1972).
49. Many judges support the idea of regional planning authorities. The crea-
tion of such a regional body, however, is a legislative task. The solutions discussed
here are those available to the judiciary.
50. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Speaking for the Court, Justice Sutherland stated
that any restriction on use which resulted in serious injury violated the landowner's
rights under the fourteenth amendment if the health, safety, convenience or general
welfare of the city were not promoted.
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In that case, the Court focused exclusively on the effect of zoning
legislation on the general welfare of the zoned community and im-
plied that the Euclid test was met by legislation which fostered
the welfare of that community."
The case law which adopted this expansive reading of local
police powers to zone52 resulted in a pattern of local zoning de-
signed to serve only local needs. 53  When combined with the pre-
sumption of validity which attached to a municipal ordinance, this
reading presented a difficult burden for a challenging party.5 4 This
common judicial view of the relationship between local police powers
and local zoning powers under state zoning enabling legislation re-
sulted in a liberal construction of zoning in favor of municipalities;
a general welfare issue would be resolved in terms of the welfare
of the political unit promulgating the ordinance.55 The application
51. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The same implication
operated in the court's analysis of Ramapo's phased growth plan. Though argu-
ably exclusionary, the plan clearly fostered the local general welfare. Since that
simple test was satisfied, the court went no further in its analysis of the plan.
52. See Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938). The police power should not be defined "so narrowly that it would exclude
reasonable restrictions placed upon the use of property in order to aid the development
of new districts in accordance with plans calculated to advance the public welfare of
the city in the future." Id. at 229, 15 N.E.2d at 590. Long range planning is a valid
exercise of the police power, but limited in its scope to fostering the general welfare
of the municipality where it fails to include regional interests.
53. Many cases which construed the Euclid test in this narrow fashion were
decided by the same courts which interpreted the general welfare test broadly.
See, e.g., Lumond v. Board of Adjustment, 6 N.J. Super. 474, 69 A.2d 361 (Super.
Ct., L. Div. 1949), ajfd, 4 N.J. 577, 73 A.2d 545 (1950), Duffcon Concrete Prods.,
Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 437 (1949).
54. Zoning regulations are presumed to be for the general welfare of the com-
munity. To this presumption is often added the common presumption that the
regulation, as a municipal ordinance, is valid. This compounding of presumptions
grants a substantial degree of immunity to local zoning boards. The lower court in
Lumond v. Board of Adjustment, 6 N.J. Super. 474, 69 A.2d 361 (Super. Ct., L. Div.
1949), aff'd 4 N.J. 577, 73 A.2d 545 (1950), noted that zoning ordinances
[A]re permitted for the purpose of promoting the general welfare . . . and it
is presumed that the restrictions in a zoning ordinance limiting the use of
land to a specified purpose is in the public interest . . . they are usually
designed to guide the future growth and development of a municipality for
the common good.
Id. at 478, 69 A.2d at 363. Affirming the decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
clearly subordinated regional planning to the maintenance of local property values.
4 N.J. at 585, 73 A.2d at 549. The court viewed zoning as an "overall scheme which
is set up for the general welfare of the several districts and the entire [local] com-
munity." Id.
55. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), where the New Jersey Supreme Court approved minimum lot sizes and sug-
gested that the responsibilities of the township to the region would be met by main-
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of the general welfare test often degenerated into an inquiry of
whether the zoning ordinance in question was a proper exercise of
the police power. If the municipality had the power to promulgate
the ordinance, then the ordinance served the general welfare.
56
Often, courts would refuse to deal at all with questions of general
welfare raised in zoning cases. These courts preferred to leave the
determination of the general welfare to legislative bodies.17  This
inaction affirmed existing zoning policy, since the bodies to which
the courts deferred were the same bodies whose decisions had
been challenged. 8
In Vickers v. Township Committee59 the New Jersey Supreme
Court deferred to the judgment of local zoning officials since, in its
view, a municipality's decision that the zoning plan would advance
municipal welfare was determinative. According to the court, a
municipality which was largely undeveloped was not obligated to
include every kind of use somewhere in the developed township.6
The appellate division had suggested that there was probably an
acceptable location elsewhere in the region for a trailer park and
that because of alternative location, the defendant was not required
taining the high value of land in the municipality. See also Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The court in Lionshead Lake indicated that zoning
powers under the state enabling act will be construed liberally in favor of munici-
palities. 10 N.J. at 171, 89 A.2d at 696.
56. Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J. Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46 (Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1956). The emphasis was on the local community as a social unit.
The only concession to extramunicipal interests was in the common boundary situa-
tion of Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
57. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851
(1958). The court stated that the zoning of a neighboring town cannot control a
municipal zoning ordinance. While the general welfare is an important element in
resolving whether a zoning ordinance is within the police powers, the task of ascer-
taining whether it serves the public interest is best left to the legislature and courts
should not substitute their views for those of the legislature. Id. at 72, 141 A.2d at
856.
58. See Bonaldo v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 146 Conn. 595, 153 A.2d 429
(1959). The parties shared a border which had been zoned by both municipalities
for residential use. When North Haven rezoned its portion for industrial use, the
court held that the revision did not change the comprehensive plan of zoning in New
Haven. Id. at 598, 153 A.2d at 430. See also Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of
Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (discussed at note 29 supra). There is no
indication in the opinion that the court in Bonaldo considered the implications of
judicial approval of insular attitudes in zoning for the welfare of the larger regional
community.
59. .37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962). Trailer camps and trailer parks were
excluded from a district zoned for industrial use by the ordinance in question.
60. The court cited Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1
N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949), and Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10
N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), in support of this proposition.
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to make any provision for such a use. The supreme court reversed,
but reaffirmed the power of municipalities to exclude undesirable
uses from the community.61
This decision points out the tension between Ramapo and the
district court opinion in Petaluma. Like the majority in Vickers,
the Ramapo court permitted an exclusionary and insular zoning
plan which forced potential residents to go somewhere else to live
without considering the effect on that "somewhere." The Ramapo
court was in accord with the Vickers majority in its approval of
judicial deference to the wisdom of local zoning authorities. In
contrast, the Petaluma court recognized that municipal authorities, if
unrestrained, would act to the detriment of other communities to
achieve municipal benefit. That court required local authorities to
consider the effect of local zoning on all the "somewheres" that
might be affected by a local decision to limit one type of land use
or another.62
The common statutory requirement of a comprehensive plan of
zoning63 has helped to perpetuate the narrow reading of the Euclid
61. 181 A.2d at 133. Justice Hall's dissent in Vickers has been cited with
approval far more frequently than the majority opinion. He condemned the barring
of the mobile homes by zoning as a symbol of municipal power to exclude "according
to local whim or selfish desire, and to use the zoning power for aims beyond its legit-
imate purposes." He advocated zoning with the needs of the region in mind:
Their political boundaries are artificial and hence of relatively little signifi-
cance beyond defining one unit of local government. . . . They would be
well advised to plan with adjoining communities, especially for joint public
services and facilities. Intercommunity planning is also best able to accom-
modate those categories of uses that ought not be excluded everywhere,
but which may be more desirably located in one municipality rather than
another.
Id. at 254, 181 A.2d at 141. Justice Hall found the majority's approval of Gloucester's
ordinance unacceptable inasmuch as it encouraged the formulation of zoning plans
with no regard for impact on nonresidents. "[N]o matter how broadly the concept
is viewed, it cannot authorize a municipality to erect a completely isolationist wall
on its boundaries .... [C]ourts must not be hesitant to strike down purely selfish
and undemocratic enactments." Id. at 262-65, 181 A.2d at 145-47.
62. Barone v. Bridgewater Township, 45 N.J. 224, 212 A.2d 129 (1965). In
that decision the court noted that the use of the doctrine allowing or requiring the
consideration of regional land use had been used to justify exclusion of undesirable
uses, not to force inclusion of such uses.
It would certainly be a perversion to twist this salutary concept to require a
municipality to zone its highway frontage so that all of the detrimental effects
its neighbors have brought about will be duplicated within its borders in
spite of its long continued effort to prevent that very consequence.
Id. at 235, 212 A.2d at 135.
63. Zoning enabling statutes usually require that all local ordinances be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan of zoning. This requirement is intended to
prevent the arbitrary or capricious use of the zoning power by the municipality.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000 (West 1966); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
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general welfare test. In Udell v. Haast 4 the court explained that
a zoning board, in exercising its powers under the enabling legisla-
tion, must act for the benefit of the community as a whole following
a careful examination of alternative actions and must not act to
satisfy "the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority
of the [municipal] community."65  Evidence that forethought had
been given to the community's land use problems was a factor in
determining whether the statutory requirement that the zoning be in
accordance with the master plan was satisfied. What the court cre-
ated, however, was a circular test for determining whether the gen-
eral welfare had been served by zoning legislation:
Where a community, after a careful and deliberate review
of "the present and reasonably foreseeable needs of the
community," adopts a general developmental policy for the
community as a whole and amends its zoning law in ac-
cordance with that plan, courts can have some confi-
dence that the public interest is being served ....66
As long as the zoning board acted in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan, the court assumed that the substantive requirements
of health, safety, morals, and general welfare were satisfied. Since
the comprehensive plan was not examined for substance, however,
the court's assumption was not well founded. Ramapo followed
Udell v. Haas; the Petaluma trial court required that courts look
beyond a finding that an ordinance complied with a comprehensive
plan and determine the real-world effect of that plan.
In Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,67 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit protected the threatened en-
vironment instead of requiring a zoning plan which was responsive
to regional needs. Since many individuals in the region surround-
ing Sanbornton desired housing in the community, the general re-
gional welfare logically would have been served by invalidating the
defendant's rezoning plan. The court held, however, that the decision
to disallow development which would change both ecology and
scenery, as well as the character and financial burdens of a town,
125.582 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 (1967); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1974); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 713.06 (Page 1964).
64. 21 N.Y.2d 463. 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
65. Id. at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900, 288 N.Y.S. 2d at 893.
66. Id. at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S. 2d at 894.
67. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). The plaintiff developer attacked the defendant
resort community's rezoning law that increased minimum lot sizes from 35,000
square feet to 3 acres and 6 acres. The township argued that rezoning to 3-acre and
6-acre minimum lots was necessary because of drainage conditions and projected
pollution and traffic increases.
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was within the concept of general welfare. The local zoning board
was empowered to make that decision.68  The Steel Hill court ap-
proved the normally suspect minimum lot size ordinance because
the measure was considered a stopgap technique pending more pre-
cise planning. The thrust of the opinion, however, was that the
threat of local ecological damage would override the general regional
demand for housing.69
The Steel Hill decision may be significant for another reason.
In the past courts had not relied solely on the general welfare ele-
ment of the Euclid test to sustain a zoning ordinance. Instead,
such decisions had been buttressed by findings that the public health,
safety, or morals were also served by the ordinance in question. In
Steel Hill there was no evidence that the public health, safety, or
morals were protected by a requirement that all building lots in
Sanbornton be at least three acres. Consequently, under the Steel
Hill rationale zoning based only on an undefined general welfare
may well be valid, and that general welfare need only be that of the
municipality.7 °
VI. THE RAMAPO PLAN
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo7' may represent a po-
sition which will be adopted by many courts. The zoning plan
adopted by Ramapo was a scenario for development over a period of
18 years. This technique, known as phased zoning or development
timing, was defended as a tool to control growth without unreason-
ably curtailing development or the free enjoyment of property.
Under the plan, building permits were to be granted upon applica-
tion by qualifying developers if certain public facilities72 were shown
to be available to the proposed building site. An involved point
system based primarily on the proximity of these facilities to the site
was to be used to determine developer eligibility for a permit. If
facilities were not available, the builder could either wait until the
master plan called for extension of facilities to the part of town in
which the site was located or install the required facilities at his own
68. Id. at 963.
69. It is not clear whether the court's subordination of housing to environ-
mental concerns was related to the fact that the housing in question was recreational
vacation housing rather than primary housing.
70. 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (1973).
71. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
72. (1) sewers, (2) drainage, (3) recreational facilities, (4) public roads, (5)
firehouses. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
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expense. Since the plan called for these facilities to be developed
throughout the town within 18 years, the plan did not forbid growth
outright. It did, however, effectively delay natural development.
Developers and landowners brought suit to challenge the validity
of the plan. These plaintiffs claimed that the municipality was not
empowered by the enabling legislation to control the tempo of de-
velopment.73 They also argued that the plan was unconstitutional
both as an unreasonable restraint on the marketability of the land
and, by the exclusion of new residents, as a violation of equal pro-
tection.
The plan was upheld against both constitutional objections.74
The court stated that "[t]he power to restrict and regulate conferred
under [the enabling statute] includes within its grant, by way of
necessary implication, the authority to direct the growth of popula-
tion for the purposes indicated, within the confines of the town-
ship. 75 The court conceded that a zoning ordinance which sought
to restrict permanently the use of property for any reasonable pur-
pose was a taking,7a but stated that the problem did not arise in
Ramapo because of the town's expected good faith and apparent
intention to adhere to its self-imposed schedule of development.7 7
Since the required facilities would all be provided by the municipal
authorities within 18 years, the plan was not a taking. A critical
part of the Ramapo opinion was, then, that 18 years was not a suf-
ficiently long period of restriction to qualify as an unconstitutional
taking of property without compensation.
Under the Ramapo reasoning, a plan of phased growth was held
to be within the ambit of zoning enabling legislation authorizing
comprehensive plans to promote health and general welfare and to
encourage the most appropriate use of the land.78 Since the power
73. The court cited Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d
255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1957), which held invalid a local zoning ordinance
restricting the number of new residential building permits as an unconstitutional
taking without compensation and as exceeding the powers granted to local authorities
by the zoning enabling act. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
370, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 145 (1972).
74. An earlier case, Rubin v. McAlevey, 54 Misc. 2d 338, 282 N.Y.S.2d 564
(Sup. Ct. 1967), affid, 29 App. Div. 2d 874, 288 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1968), approved a plan
freezing all development in Ramapo for 90 days while the master plan was being
completed.
75. 30 N.Y.2d at 371, 285 N.E.2d at 297, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
76. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
77. Id. at 379-80, 285 N.E.2d at 302-03, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
78. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The court exhibited a
sensitivity to the problems of exclusionary zoning, but failed to recognize the exclu-
sionary nature of the Ramapo plan.
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of the municipality to zone land within its borders was grounded
in a legislative enactment, the court deferred to that body's judg-
ment. Ramapo's proposed system of phased growth was deemed
acceptable as the comprehensive plan of zoning required by the en-
abling legislation.79
To analyze Ramapo in a general welfare context, the crucial
points to consider are the approval of an 18-year plan and the accep-
tance of the scheme as a comprehensive plan without examining its
impact on the surrounding community. Under Ramapo, even if the
restrictions on residential development remained outstanding for
the life of the program, those restrictions were found to be short of
confiscation within the meaning of the Constitution.8 0  The court
held that 18 years of restriction was not a taking of property from
a landowner but did not consider whether such restriction might be
a taking of welfare from the region. Eighteen years of more-than-
proportional growth for neighboring communities in a period of
rapid population expansion could result in serious general welfare
problems for those municipalities.
The reaction of the district court in Petaluma to a similar plan
was more appropriate. The Petaluma court recognized the poten-
tial injury to a region in a plan designed to benefit only the munici-
pality. Implied in this analysis is the further recognition of two
separate but coexisting units whose welfare must be served by local
zoning-the municipality and the region. The New York court found
that a plan benefiting the municipality could stand without consid-
eration of the effect on regional welfare; the district court in Peta-
luma required that the plan injure neither unit if it were to be found
valid.
In approving the Ramapo plan on the basis of its conformance
with a comprehensive plan, the court approved technical compli-
79. Finding the plan in procedural conformance with the enabling statute, the
court declined to examine the plan's effect on the general welfare. "[O]urs re-
mains the function of defining the metes and bounds beyond which local regulations
may not venture, regardless of their professedly beneficient purposes." Id. at 377,
285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
80. The court did not appear to consider the effect on surrounding communities
of Ramapo's artificial shackling of natural population growth. The housing needs of
a region must be met; if Ramapo refused to accept its proportionate share (and a
court condoned the refusal), then nearby communities would be forced to absorb not
only their respective shares but also a portion of the share diverted by Ramapo.
The court's approval of the Ramapo plan encouraged communities to zone for their
own welfare at the expense of the welfare of neighboring communities. See
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 110
(1966); Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 1251 (1966).
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ance. The Petaluma court, in comparison, took some pains to go
past the test of conformity to determine the substantive effect of
the plan. Phased zoning may contribute both to the shortage and
the high cost of housing in a metropolitan area, thereby facilitating
the exclusion of all lower income urban residents desiring housing in
the municipality. 8' Furthermore, Ramapo's refusal to accept growth
resulted in a shift in growth to land farther from the urban center,
reducing open space and contributing to the problem of urban
sprawl.82 While the Ramapo plan halted urban sprawl within the
borders of the municipality, the plan was equally effective in guaran-
teeing its spread throughout the metropolitan region.83 The court's
opinion thus was a substantial retreat from judicial encouragement
of regionally oriented zoning.
84
In general, commentator reaction to Ramapo and to phased
zoning has been favorable. 85 It has been noted that the judiciary
has abandoned in some cases the assumption that the "general wel-
fare of the community" included only the welfare of the municipality
that adopted the ordinance and has instead assessed the reasonable-
ness of the ordinances in a regional context.8 6 However, the empha-
sis by some courts on regional needs has been considered inappro-
priate by these commentators, and phased zoning similar to the
Ramapo model has been suggested as the better alternative. Ju-
dicial intervention in regional land use problems has been termed
81. See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 234 (1973). See text accompanying note
119 infra.
82. In this context "urban sprawl" is simply the extension of the ring of suburbs
surrounding an urban center in a haphazard and unplanned manner of development.
83. Bosselman, supra note 81, at 248.
84. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
85. See generally Clark & Grable, Growth Control in California: Prospects for
Local Government Implementation of Timing and Sequential Control of Residential
Development, 5 PAC. L.J. 570 (1974); Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo:
New Directions in Land Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 56 (1973);
Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
298 (1955); Editor's Comments, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New
Dimension in American Planning Law, 4 URBAN LAWYER ix (1972); Note, Golden v.
Planning Board: Time Phased Development Control Through Zoning Standards, 38
ALBANY L. REV. 142 (1973); Note, A Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo
Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723
(1972); Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land De-
velopment, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1974). For critical comments on points raised in
the articles cited above see text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
86. Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land
Development, supra note 85, at 608. Oakwood v. Madison is cited as an example.
The references to general welfare are made in the context of an equal protection
analysis of phased zoning.
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costly because courts cannot deal comprehensively with all of the
problems of land use planning. Consequently, it has been urged
that any remedies devised by the judiciary are piece-meal and frag-
mented. While courts may identify regional needs, they cannot im-
pose an integrated regional plan, only a legislature can impose re-
gional planning. Some fear that judicial intervention may paralyze
legislative efforts to bring reason to land use planning.8 7 These op-
ponents of judicial intervention believe, as did the Ramapo court,
that the 18-year plan is a proper way to deal with the problem of
uncontrolled growth:
Highly restrictive zoning ordinances [like Ramapo's] are not
irreversible commitments; if nothing else, they keep land
available for later uses. Judicial invalidation of such ordi-
nances, on the other hand, would presumably be followed
by an irreversible commitment of some of the land to high
density uses.
88
While Ramapo's 18-year plan may not represent an irreversible
commitment as far as Ramapo itself is concerned (Ramapo may at
any time decide to allow development of local lands), neighboring
communities, constrained to accept the growth Ramapo had diverted
to them, may have to change their positions irreversibly in the in-
terim. The tendency of municipalities to zone to protect a desired
way of life was not subjected to a similar inquiry by the commenta-
tors. If courts do not strike down ordinances like Ramapo's,
there is substantial danger that the tendency will never be curtailed.
If legislative bodies also remain reluctant to approve regional or
national land use legislation, then regional welfare will never be
represented at all.
VII. THE PETALUMA PLAN
The zoning plan adopted by Petaluma and brought before the
district court in Construction Industry Association v. City of Peta-
luma 9 was enacted in response to a rapid rate of population growth
in the San Francisco suburb which began after World War II and
accelerated in the 1960's. The municipality had traditionally been
an agricultural community and desired to maintain its character
rather than become yet another commuter suburb. The number of
housing units completed annually in the municipality had increased
87. Id. at 610. It is arguable that judicial exposure of failures in the current
land use system would provoke rather than inhibit legislative action. Id. at 610-I1.
88. Id. at 611.
89. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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from 270 in 1964 to 891 in 1971.90 The ordinance was designed to
limit growth to a rate acceptable to the municipality. The plan91 had
two important features: (1) the city was divided into two areas,
an urban core circled by a perimeter area; and (2) the perimeter
area would have no city facilities extended to it for 15 years, while
no more than 500 new building permits would be issued each year
for the urban core. Permits granted were to be awarded on the
basis of a rating system which created a competitive situation
92among applicants.
The findings of fact 93 indicated a willingness to assume the task
which the Ramapo court had rejected-evaluation of the zoning plan
in terms of its long-range implications for the region. The defen-
dant's 30-year water contract was scrutinized; the court found that
Petaluma had intentionally contracted for water sufficient to support
no more than the desired level of population. The city's claim that
the plan was necessary to prevent the overburdening of a water and
sewage system inadequate to support natural growth was rejected.
It was found that when the plan was first adopted, all public facil-
90. Id. at 575.
91. Prior to its enactment, the proposed plan was approved by the citizens of
the city in a questionnaire survey. Id. at 576.
92. The court expressed doubts about the sincerity of Petaluma's rating sys-
tem:
The rating system employed is an intricate one .... Although we do not
understand plaintiffs to attack the rating concept itself, they do contend that
the application of this particular system's terms resembles a "Catch-22" type
of operation; apparently nobody really knows what regulations will be ap-
plied, or how, or by whom. Plaintiffs argue that the merit rating system, as
employed by these defendants, is actually a hazing system intended to dis-
courage unwanted builders from acquiring permission to build.
Id. at 577.
93. The court devoted a large part of its opinion to findings of fact. This sec-
tion of the opinion is a careful analysis of the implications of the plan for the housing
region surrounding San Francisco. In a separate section entitled "Conclusions of
Law," the court considered the constitutional questions raised by the plan-particularly
the right to travel, equal protection of the law, and general welfare.
There seems to be a somewhat tenuous connection, if not an outright disparity,
between the court's findings of fact and its conclusions of law. It may well be that
the court found that Petaluma, by artificially limiting the natural growth of the
housing supply, did in fact violate the right of potential residents to travel to and
obtain housing in the Bay Area. See note 102 infra. However, the lavish attention
given to the portion of the opinion dealing with the findings of fact, compared with
the somewhat cursory treatment given the right to travel issue in the conclusions of
law section, suggests otherwise. The structure of the opinion and the reliance on
nontraditional inputs (market demand for housing, statistical projection of housing
shortages, growth center theory, threshhold housing, etc.) indicate that the court may
have been more concerned with the result of the litigation than with the strict in-
tegrity of the legal reasoning. While the right to travel is clearly implicated in this
case, the court uses the right to bootstrap a factual result. See Note, The Right to
Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J. LEGIs. 244 (1975).
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ities were capable of absorbing a level of population growth equal to
the free market demand for housing in Petaluma.94
In examining the plan's impact on the regional housing market,
the district court noted that the ordinance limited construction of
new residential housing to a range of one-third to one-half of the
market demand. 95 The San Francisco regional housing market was
described as a self-contained, unitary housing market.
Persons excluded from one suburb do not leave the re-
gion but seek housing elsewhere in the area. Where sub-
urbs not practicing growth limitations are forced to absorb
not only their own "share" of the population's growth, but
also the excluding suburb's as well, they tend to retaliate
by adopting exclusionary measures of their own. It is ap-
propriate to measure the potential effects that the exclusion
practiced by Petaluma would have if it proliferated through-
out the region itself.
96
The limitation of growth when demand is static or rising is respon-
sible for higher costs for new housing, higher rentals and longer life
for substandard tenant housing, as well as the exclusion of center
city residents who desire suburban housing. "The overall nature
of the region's housing stock will decline." 97 It should be noted that
the Ramapo court failed to make any similar analysis of the effect
of that municipality's 18-year plan on the quality of housing in the
New York metropolitan housing region.
In the findings of fact, Petaluma was designated as a "growth
center" in the San Francisco region with the capacity to absorb new
residents.
Residential growth in such centers, though larger than in
some other cities in the region, is not disproportionately
larger in the sense that market, economic, demographic
and other forces within the region dictate that growth shall
occur in substantial part in growth centers.
If such growth centers curtail residential growth to less
than demographic and market rates, as has been attempted
in the present case, serious and damaging dislocation will
occur in the housing market, the commerce it represents,
and in the travel and settlement of people in need and in
search of housing. Even in the cities in the region that do
not qualify as "growth centers," the same exclusion of resi-
94. 375 F. Supp. at 577.
95. The court also designated the housing industry in Petaluma as interstate
commerce. Id.
96. Id. at 579.
97. Id.
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dential growth would lead to substantially the same ad-
verse consequences if the exclusion were region-wide.98
The court determined that growth must occur, if at all, in the growth
centers, since housing expansion could not economically be forced
out of the growth centers into new towns, rural areas or the center
city.
The court anticipated a housing shortage of approximately 105,000
units in the San Francisco region in the decade 1970-1980 if the
Petaluma plan were allowed to stand. This shortage would lead to
high housing costs which, in turn, would inhibit interstate, intrastate,
and foreign travel.99 The most serious impact would be on "thresh-
old housing"-the least expensive housing available without govern-
ment subsidy. The court found that the lack of sufficient threshold
housing would injure the class of regional residents with incomes
between $8,000 and $14,000.10° The court then summarized its find-
ings of fact:
The aggregate effect of a proliferation of the "Petaluma
Plan" throughout the San Francisco region would be a de-
cline in regional housing stock quality, a loss of the mobil-
ity of current and prospective residents and a deterioration
in the quality and choice of housing available to income
earners with real incomes of $14,000 per year or less. l'
Even more significant than the district court's finding that the
general welfare of the region would be seriously injured by the
Petaluma zoning ordinance is the process the court employed in
reaching its conclusion. The court made an examination of the prac-
tical results of the plan rather than simply reviewing the plan's
conformity with the enabling legislation. There can be no doubt
that the results of the plan served the general welfare of Petaluma
and its residents. The key to the court's findings of fact was that
the plan did not serve the general welfare of the region. This flaw
was fatal. Had the Ramapo court engaged in a similar analysis,
it is arguable that it too would have struck down the plan in ques-
tion.
The court based its conclusions of law on the right to travel
as a fundamental right under the fourteenth amendment.10 2  The
98. Id.
99. Id. at 580-81.
100. Id. at 581.
101. Id.
102. The court cited as authority, inter alia, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 760 (1941). The court's deci-
sion to base its findings of law on the right to travel rather than on violation of the
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strict holding of the lower court in Petaluma was that the city's
zoning plan infringed the constitutionally protected right to travel
and was therefore invalid. The significance of the opinion and the
court's reasoning process, however, go far beyond the strict holding;
Petaluma is more than another right to travel case. Even though
by its terms Petaluma is not a general welfare case, in precedential
significance and impact it is very much a general welfare case. As
a right to travel case, it functions as an application of the right to
travel doctrine 0 3 to a particular set of facts. In the general welfare
and zoning context, Petaluma is unique; the court broke both with
traditional deference to local zoning power and with minimal exam-
ination of a plan's conformity with the comprehensive plan. The
court subordinated the luxuries of a municipality to the pressing
needs of a region by examining the substance and long-range ef-
fects of the comprehensive plan. The major import of the opinion
is its potential effect on the consideration of no-growth ordinances
by other courts. Petaluma's problem was not unique, and other
municipalities may attempt to solve the problem with the same type
of zoning plan. If the lower court decision in Petaluma has any
pervasive influence on judicial treatment of these plans, then that
influence will be reflected in the decision of other courts to engage
in the detailed analysis of the effects of the zoning plans before
them.10 4 Once the decision and the analysis are made, ample grounds
general welfare is difficult to understand. The right to travel argument is not the
natural progeny of the court's elaborate findings of fact; rather it seems a bootstrap
argument designed to justify the decision under a doctrine which is more widely ac-
cepted than is regional welfare. The persuasiveness of the opinion is diminished by
the reliance on a legal doctrine that might be termed extraneous to both the facts of
the case and the interests of the litigants. See note 93 supra. See also Note, The
Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J. LEGis. 244 (1975).
103. The right to travel doctrine was developed in Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (right to travel is protected by the fourteenth amendment) and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for welfare
eligibility violates right of interstate travel).
104. Judicial review of municipal zoning for its conformity with the welfare stand-
ard gives some guarantee that an abuse of municipal discretion will not occur
without a remedy while permitting cities to retain primary power and discretion.
Some argue that the formulation of standards for land use decisionmaking is exclu-
sively a legislative function, but municipal planning bodies have shown themselves
to be unresponsive to public needs beyond municipal boundaries. State and national
legislative bodies have been reluctant to become involved at all. This abdication of
legislative responsibility leaves the protection of the interests of extra-municipal
residents to the judiciary.
While controversy has often raged about judicial action in other areas, it has
always been recognized that it is an essential part of the judicial function to
watch over the parochial and exclusionist attitudes and policies of local
governments, and to see to it that these do not run counter to national policy
and the general welfare.
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such as equal protection, unconstitutional confiscation of property,
abuse of powers under state enabling legislation or failure to exer-
cise general welfare powers in a manner consistent with the general
welfare are available to support the decision.
The district court in Petaluma stated that the ordinance under
question was an exclusionary zoning law. The plan was found to
violate the constitutionally protected right to travel because of its
exclusionary effect. The individual has a right to decide where he
will live and Petaluma, by assuming the power to decide for the in-
dividual, had violated that right.
Since the right to travel has been considered fundamental, the
court noted that a compelling state interest would have to be fur-
thered by the ordinance if Petaluma's plan were to withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny. Petaluma offered for consideration three areas
of concern which it claimed would be improved or furthered by the
ordinance-an insufficient water supply, an inadequate sewage dis-
posal system, and a municipal interest in limiting the growth of
population within its borders. The court rejected the first two in
the findings of fact:
Where a municipality purposefully limits the quantity of
any particular commodity available, then seeks to justify
a population limitation based upon an alleged inadequacy
of that commodity, it has not stated a compelling interest
which supports the limitation. Petaluma has so proceeded
in the present case, and accordingly, it has failed to offer a
compelling state interest in this regard.
Additionally, "alternative means," including the cur-
rent ability to request more water supplies from its source,
are available to the defendants. For both reasons, there-
fore, the purported justification set out above must fail.10 5
The municipal interest in the control of its own rate of growth
and the citizens' desires to protect small town character were also
Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 318
(1955).
This may be unacceptable as a permanent solution because of the need for some
sort of legislative determination of the issues. But until significant legislative action
is achieved, this model allows municipalities to continue rational land use planning
programs subject only to a court-imposed rule of reason protecting the interests of those
who are otherwise unrepresented. It is not suggested that municipalities be barred
or even discouraged from engaging in land use planning. The planning process is
essential to the orderly development of housing and public services. Without plan-
ning, urban sprawl is inevitable. The emphasis must be on making the planning process
more rational by involving a larger portion of the concerned parties. The desired goal
is an active planning process serving the needs not only of the zoned community but
also the needs of affected outsiders.
105. 375 F. Supp. at 583.
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found to be insufficient justification for exclusionary ordinances.
The court restated the issue: "[M]ay a municipality capable of sup-
porting a natural population expansion limit growth simply because
it does not prefer to grow at the rate which would be dictated by
prevailing market demand[?]"'0 6  In its consideration of the issue,
the court adopted the same position toward exclusionary zoning as
the Pennsylvania judiciary. Bilbar Construction, National Land,
Kit-Mar and Girsh were cited with approval.'17 The district court's
holding reflected this posture:
Since the population limitation policies complained of are
not supported by any compelling governmental interest the
exclusionary aspects of the "Petaluma Plan" must be, and
are hereby declared in violation of the right to travel and,
hence, are unconstitutional . . . .Such holding is intended
to encompass, not only the outright numerical limitations
upon the issuance of building permits, but also any and all
features of the plan which, directly or indirectly, seek to
control population growth by any means other than market
demands.' "
The Petaluma court's reliance on market demand as the crucial
measuring device for determining the effect of a zoning plan on the
general welfare was the single most important difference between it
and the Ramapo court. Market demand was a manifestation of
interests almost completely external to the municipality.' °9 The
municipality could not effectively manipulate the demand, and its
residents were not numerous enough to have a controlling effect on
the demand. The thrust of Ramapo and its predecessors was that
internal influences were essential elements in shaping local zoning
legislation. If the district court's analytic model should achieve
widespread acceptance, then the traditional reservation of power to
the local community to shape its style of living without regard to
the impact on nonresidents would be ended. This power would be
replaced by a new power, still local, but limited in scope by the
106. Id.
107. See notes 33-41 supra and accompanying text.
108. 375 F. Supp. at 586.
109. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1432-33 (1969). Market
dynamics is perhaps the single external factor most responsible for the development
of exclusionary zoning. Sale of land on the free market would result in lower prices
and increased density. Unrestricted transfer would also preclude effective municipal
planning for future growth. Id. But municipal zoning decisions which disregard
market demand for housing and land result in accommodation of the internal in-
terests of the municipality only, often at the expense of all parties with no input into
the decisionmaking process who are affected by the decision. 375 F. Supp. at 583.
See also Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1971).
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housing market. In effect, all interested parties and not just mu-
nicipal residents would be represented in the decisionmaking pro-
cess leading to zoning legislation.1 ° Those communities tempted
to follow Petaluma's example would not be able to exercise exclu-
sive control over the decisionmaking process.
VIII. Petaluma AND Ramapo IN LIGHT OF Belle Terre
The different approaches of the courts reviewing the Ramapo
and Petaluma zoning plans indicate the uncertainty that attaches
to the judicial scrutiny of any zoning scheme. Forecasting the
judicial reaction to plans limiting the rate and level of municipal
population growth is an exercise in speculation. Often a court must
choose between a valid municipal concern and a valid regional argu-
ment. A recent Supreme Court decision suggested that the mu-
nicipal argument may prevail.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas"' the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of a local zoning ordinance that prohibited
the occupancy by more than two unrelated persons of a single-
family dwelling although the ordinance permitted occupancy by
any number of blood-related individuals. The plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the ordinance on the grounds that it violated
both the right to travel and the right to privacy, and that the govern-
ment did not have a proper interest in preserving social homo-
geneity."
12
The Court's analysis built upon its perceptions of the municipal
power to zone elucidated in Euclid and Berman v. Parker, where
110. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, supra note 109, at 1432-33.
111. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The action was brought by the owners of a building
and by three of the six unrelated college students to whom the premises had been
leased.
The Supreme Court has decided few zoning cases since the landmark Euclid
decision. While on the surface Belle Terre did not deal with precisely the problems
present in Petaluma and Ramapo, the decision indicated certain judicial preferences
which might influence the Court in an analysis of a no-growth ordinance which had
been challenged on general welfare grounds. This, of course, is not to say that Belle
Terre dealt exclusively or primarily with general welfare, but the Court's reaffirm-
•ance of the municipal power to make zoning decisions may influence the future judi-
cial response to no-growth plans.
112. Id. at 7. Other grounds were that the ordinance interfered with the right to
migrate to and settle within a state, that it barred people found unacceptable by local
residents, that it "expresses the social preferences of the residents for groups that
will be congenial to them," id., that the villagers have no rightful concern with the
marital status of cohabiting residents, and "that the ordinance is antithetical to the
Nation's experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and inte-
grated society." Id.
1975]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
extensive discretion was granted to local authorities."' Initially,
the Court focused on its decision in Euclid to allow zoning to pre-
vent noise, increased traffic, and dangerous living conditions. The
village of Belle Terre had argued that unrelated people living to-
gether would create more traffic and parking problems. The dis-
cussion in Belle Terre of Berman centered around the goal of the
ordinance sustained in that case, i.e., the development of an attrac-
tive, balanced community. The court in Berman had given substan-
tial latitude to municipal authorities in dealing with social and
economic problems through zoning. Referring to this, the Court
stated in Belle Terre: "We refused to limit the concept of public
welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations."
'
"
4
In dismissing the arguments advanced by the students who re-
sided in Belle Terre, the Court stated that since no fundamental
rights were implicated, the statute's validity depended upon its rea-
sonable relation to a proper objective rather than to a compelling
state interest. The Court then held that the ordinance was rea-
sonably related to a permissible state interest.'
5
In writing for the Court, Justice Douglas approved a broad power
for a municipality to zone for the local welfare:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use
project addressed to family needs . . . .The police pow-
er is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and un-
healthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
113. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Congress had passed legislation to redevelop a blighted
area of the District of Columbia. The owner of a department store argued that the
purpose of the legislation was not to rid the area of slums but to develop, under the
management of a private agency, a better balanced, more attractive community.
Therefore, his property could not be taken under the statute even with just compen-
sation.
114. 416 U.S. at 5. This concise restatement of the Berman position is of little
help in illuminating the Court's position on regional general welfare or local general
welfare.
115. Id. at 7. The Court's equal protection analysis has been criticized. While
the Court used a two-tiered equal protection analysis perhaps the facts of Belle Terre
justified a use of a middle level scrutiny which has been used in cases involving clas-
sifications of illegitimacy, indigency, and sex, among others. The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 124 (1974). If the scrutiny had been more intensive,
the Court might have found the ordinance unconstitutional:
One could infer that a locality in the exercise of its zoning authority bears a
lesser burden of demonstrating the rationality of its classifications than it
would in other contexts . . . . In this type of case there appears to be little
justification for particularly restrained review. The Court's implication that
as a general rule it will be deferential in reviewing zoning cases seems un-
fortunate.
Id. at 128.
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values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
116
The Court's decision suggested that "a sanctuary for present
residents" would be more appropriate language. Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion' 17 echoed the majority view: "[A]s a general prop-
osition, I see no constitutional infirmity in a town limiting the den-
sity of use in residential areas by zoning regulations which do not
discriminate on the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria."'1 8
As the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on local zon-
ing powers, Belle Terre may provide the general welfare debate with
two types of analysis-an equal protection analysis and a region/
municipality welfare analysis." 9
It is possible to view the position taken by the Supreme Court
as a rejection of the expansive definition of the general welfare
test developing in some jurisdictions. A finding that one of the
proper uses of the zoning power is to "make the area a sanctuary
for people"' 20 suggests that Petaluma's citizens would be allowed to
protect the character and ambiance of their community by cutting
off the flow of new residents at an arbitrarily low level. The lan-
guage of Belle Terre included nothing to indicate that the creation
of a sanctuary may not be accomplished at the expense of com-
munities and individuals in the housing region. The Court ap-
peared to accept without question the traditional view of zoning as
a purely local prerogative. While the lower court's reasoning in Peta-
116. 416 U.S. at 9.
117. Justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that the fundamental rights of
free association and privacy had been violated by the ordinance. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 17.
119. The effect of the Belle Terre equal protection analysis in the exclusionary
zoning context is unclear. For instance, the Supreme Court found that no fundamen-
tal right was violated by the ordinance in question, while the district court in Petaluma
rested its holding on a violation of the right to travel. In the Belle Terre opinion the
Court gives no indication of how it would handle a zoning case in which the right to
travel was violated. In particular, there are no clues which suggest whether the
Court would find that Petaluma's arguments in the district court disclosed compelling
state interests in light of Belle Terre.
120. 416 U.S. at 9.
121. Perhaps the most persuasive argument for affording recognition of
regional interests is a negative one. The alternative of doing so would be
socially unrealistic and undesirable, and in the end self-defeating. That
rejection of regional interests as valid matters of judicial concern would be
self-defeating is demonstrated by the impact such treatment would have
upon market conditions. A stabilization of supply of subdivided land in the
face of a rising regional demand for such land would markedly increase its
price, creating an increasing differential between the price of the land zoned
at the low density and the price at a higher density.
Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1254 (1966).
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luma promised a de-emphasis of local power through a balancing of
internal and external determinants of zoning, Belle Terre approved
the Ramapo approach of local zoning for local residents.1 2 2  The
Supreme Court appeared to prefer the Ramapo notion of local gen-
eral welfare to the Petaluma conception of a more broadly based
regional general welfare.
The Supreme Court has not considered the role of the compre-
hensive zoning plan in determining the validity of a local zoning
ordinance. Although the Belle Terre ordinance was part of a larger
plan, the Court failed to analyze the implications of the ordinance or
the plan for the region. The focus of the opinion was exclusively
on local power. Perhaps a comprehensive plan was enough, as long
as no fundamental rights were abridged by the plan. Such a po-
sition discouraged any effort to change the emphasis in zoning laws
from their effect on municipal governments to their impact on in-
dividuals. 124  The Petaluma district court opinion subordinated the
power interests of the city to the housing needs of people. There
122. This emphasis on local power puts zoning back where it was immediately
after the Euclid decision and ignores the developments in the 40-plus years since
[t]he Balkanization of metropolitan areas and the traditional view that the
municipality is the proper unit of government to exercise the zoning power
have combined to enable municipalities either to permit or exclude particular
land uses without much regard for the needs of the area as a whole or the
adverse impact of particular land uses upon their municipal neighbors.
Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. RaV.
367, 407 (1965).
123. At least one very influential commentator has stated that a judicial re-
quirement of conformity with a comprehensive plan is not enough; the standard
degenerates into a test of the reasonableness of the plan. He suggests that all
zoning enabling legislation should include a requirement that all comprehensive
plans be submitted to a regional body for approval before any regulations are passed
under the plan. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955). See also Woodroof, Land Use Control Policies and Population Distri-
bution in America, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (1972).
124. The treatment of zoning law as a branch of local real estate law rather
than as a branch of constitutional law, and the resulting differences between
the states, is largely due to the unwillingness of the United States Supreme
Court to see zoning as regulations affecting people and not just as regula-
tions affecting land. The justices . . . do not recognize the importance of
the more subtle forms of discrimination found in the zoning area. Conse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court has let each state go its own way
in creating its own rules.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 15
(1966).
In the context of economic and social interdependency within which our
municipalities find themselves, it makes no sense to view zoning as no more
than a form of private and local real estate law, or, worse, as the exclusive
franchise of each municipal duchy. Zoning must be treated as a matter of
public policy which has metropolitan implications.
Id. at 110.
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were alternative courses of action open to the city while housing
alternatives in the region were shrinking because of growing popu-
lation and a fixed supply of land. In balancing the interests of
the municipality and its citizens against the needs of a larger geo-
graphical and population unit, the Petaluma court found that the few
could not determine the fate of the many.
One of the common elements of the Ramapo, Petaluma, and
Belle Terre ordinances was the tendency of the zoning plans to act
as exclusionary measures, closing the residential doors of the com-
munity to prospective homeowners and renters. Most of the com-
mentators have condemned the use of exclusionary zoning,1 2 ' but in
Belle Terre the Supreme Court gave hope to those who would use
sophisticated exclusionary techniques like those employed by Peta-
luma and Ramapo to escape the changes that natural growth and
time inevitably produce. While the exclusion of newcomers 126 has
served the needs and desires of local residents, any judicial toler-
ance of such a plan was reactionary in its response to the recent de-
velopment of zoning law. Because of such tolerance, "local zoning
remains essentially what it was from the beginning-simply a process
by which the residents of a local community examine what people
propose to do with their land and decide whether or not they will
let them. 127  The Petaluma court reoriented local zoning to solve
rather than avoid problems of growth. Ramapo perpetuated the old
thinking which Belle Terre would support. 28 Local authorities at-
tempting to protect municipal interests in zoning may expect judi-
cial approval, while outsiders challenging such municipal action
should not hope for judicial protection.
125. See generally Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The
Second Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 88 (1974); Bigham
& Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Contro-
versy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1972); Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling
Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wisc. L. REV. 370; Roberts, The
Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1971); Williams, Planning Law and
Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317 (1955).
126. This assumes that such exclusion is not based on suspect categories which
would render the plan vulnerable as a denial of equal protection.
127. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QuIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 2 (1971).
128. The effect of the Supreme Court's position is at least to retard the "quiet
revolution":
The ancien regime being overthrown is the feudal system under which the
entire pattern of land development has been controlled by thousands of in-
dividual local governments, each seeking to maximize its tax base and mini-
mize its social problems, and caring less what happens to all the others.
Id. at 1.
The innovations in most cases have resulted from a growing awareness on
the part of both local communities and statewide interests that states, not
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Other interpretations of the Belle Terre opinion might limit its
role in the zoning/general welfare debate. If Belle Terre is read
narrowly, the Court considered only the power of a municipality to
exclude particular living arrangements and did not go on to examine
land use and growth decisions. The Court reaffirmed the munici-
pality's exclusive power to zone for existing housing, but the opinion
was silent on the power to zone for future development. In addi-
tion, Petaluma is nominally a right to travel case, and the Supreme
Court found no abuse of the right to travel in Belle Terre. Belle
Terre may also be restricted as a case which evaluated a municipal
definition of "family." The Supreme Court decision might be
viewed as an equal protection case of limited application which
created guidelines for identifying questions of fundamental rights
in zoning conflicts. If no fundamental rights are violated, then
the opinion may be used to test the reasonableness of state action
in zoning.
While these alternative readings are plausible, the inescapable
thrust of Belle Terre is an affirmation of the exclusive right of munici-
palities to make land use and housing decisions-of which zoning is a
crucial part-in whatever manner the local authorities determine best
serves the needs of the community. One cannot ignore the empha-
sis which the Supreme Court has placed on judicial deference to lo-
cal legislative decisions on land use. Forcing municipal planners to
evaluate regional concerns reduces their power to make independent
zoning decisions.
If the concept of regional general welfare expressed by the dis-
trict court in Petaluma is ever to gain favor over the Ramapo view
of local general welfare, the judiciary must perceive the changing
role of land in society. Traditionally courts have treated land as a
commercial commodity. In a period when growing population
threatens to saturate large geographical areas, land must be treated
as both a commodity and a natural resource. 29 Viewing land as a
commodity, traditional zoning recognizes property value theory'
30
as a means to insure the dollar value of land. This value may be
maximized through the proper use of land, but may also be dimin-
ished by planning since the dynamic forces of a free market are
local governments, are the only existing political entities capable of devising
innovative techniques and governmental structures to solve problems such as
pollution, destruction of fragile natural resources, the shortage of decent
housing, and many other problems which are now widely recognized as
simply beyond the capacity of local governments acting alone.
Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 315.
130. BABCOCK, supra note 124, at 116 ff.
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disrupted.13 ' Planning theory requires a community. to analyze
and articulate its land use goals before enacting any controls over
private land. If land is a natural resource, i.e., a resource in which
the public is entitled to share, then judicial review of zoning should
emphasize the process by which the community develops a plan to
satisfy the needs and desires of all interested parties. The analysis
made by the district court in Petaluma is the kind of general wel-
fare analysis every municipality should be required to make in pro-
mulgating zoning plans. The absence of this type of judicial analy-
sis will result in more insular zoning decisions.
32
IX. REMEDIES
The deference to local legislatures traditionally observed by
courts and state legislative bodies complicates the task of resolving
the conflict between local and regional welfare. The best solution
would be new state enabling legislation which reduces the need for
judicial review and minimizes the opportunity for municipal abuse.
Another solution and one which is more germane to the above dis-
cussion of the judicial treatment of no-growth plans is the imposi-
tion of judicially administered remedies.
A court may invalidate a zoning ordinance for failure to comply
with the state enabling statute. Since most statutes include lan-
guage requiring the municipality to zone for the general welfare, a
court might be justified in invalidating a no-growth ordinance similar
to that in Ramapo or simple statutory noncompliance. But if this
judicial disapproval is to have an effect beyond each individual case,
courts must consciously adopt and consistently enforce standards
of review which provide municipalities with some degree of cer-
tainty. The district court in Petaluma formulated standards which
meet the needs of affording certainty and municipal discretion in
planning. Courts should look beyond mere procedural compliance
131. Id. at 117.
132. The arguments for a regional orientation in zoning and even for the creation
of regional zoning boards to replace local authorities are persuasive. In Babcock,
Id. it is argued that since municipalities rely on regional, state, and federal resources
for their sustenance those municipalities should zone with the welfare of the larger
units in mind:
If the local communities are willing to pass on to larger units the responsi-
bility for policy-making in matters such as transportation, open space,
sanitation, clean air, and water resources, that not only directly affect the
value of private land but are themselves directly harmed or benefited by the
use of private land, the municipalities should not be surprised if decision-
making gravitates also to the larger community or, at the least, that the
validity of their local decisions is measured by something other than the
municipality's parochial goals.
Id. at 147-48.
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with enabling legislation and begin to examine the true effects of a
zoning plan on the region.'33 In such an evaluation of regional wel-
fare a court may draw on the expertise of the economist, the planner,
and the environmentalist to determine whether a given zoning plan
properly serves the population unit affected by it. In response to a
clear and consistent method of judicial reviei', municipalities
would seek to avoid invalidation by integrating regional needs into
their land use planning decisions.
In establishing such a procedure for review the court does not
employ any substantive requirements. The court determines
whether the plan does advance the general welfare by looking at
the substantive effects of such a plan. 134  The absence of substan-
tive guidelines maximizes the discretion of the municipality to em-
ploy its land in whatever manner it sees fit. The only significant
restriction on the municipal prerogative is that local authorities
must not manipulate land use decisions to prevent natural growth.
This maximization of local discretion is consistent with the tradi-
tional approach to zoning. It also permits the municipality, which is
133. The Supreme Court of New Jersey made exactly this type of examination
in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3198 (Oct. 6, 1975). The court
held that a municipality could not use its powers of land use regulation to make the
building of low and medium income housing physically and economically impossible.
Large lot zoning which restricted building to single family housing was held to violate
the general welfare. The court identified two obligations that municipalities must
fulfill-maximization of the availability of a variety of housing types and satisfaction
of a percentage of the regional housing demand.
The court's analysis of the general welfare issue focused on the municipal zoning
power as a mere delegation of a state power:
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police
power of the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that
power and is restricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when regula-
tion does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's
citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be dis-
regarded and must be recognized and served.
Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 726. This judicial attitude reflects the perception of the munici-
pality's relationship to the region that is expressed, albeit in a different context, by
the district court in Petaluma.
The general welfare examination made by Justice Hall, for the court, went further
than did the test he advocated in his dissent in Vickers v. Township Comm., 37
N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962). He noted that the proper provision of ade-
quate housing for all categories of people is an absolute essential in the promotion of
the general welfare which is required by zoning enabling legislation. Southern
Burlington County N.A.A.C.P., supra, 67 N.J. at -, 336 A.2d at 727. While the
language of the opinion is not precise, this statement may well mean that munici-
palities may not only be barred from restricting the availability of housing but may
also be obligated to take affirmative steps to provide a wide range of housing choices
within their boundaries. In this way the case may take a significant step beyond the
district court's holding in Petaluma.
134. See note 104, supra.
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often the only unit with sufficient knowledge and interest, to make
the best land use decision for all parties involved.
The need for much of this judicial review would be obviated
if state enabling legislation were rewritten to establish either guide-
lines or substantive standards for local zoning authorities. Existing
enabling legislation only vests municipalities with those police pow-
ers necessary for the promulgation of local zoning ordinances. An
implication of wide-ranging local discretion arises from the ab-
sence of any substantial requirements or restraints. Because the
enabling statute contains no enforceable guidelines, it is possible for
an ordinance which will have detrimental effects on a neighboring
community to comply fully with the statute.
In drafting new enabling legislation, it is important to recognize
that there is substantial merit in reserving most land use decisions
to the municipality. 35 Extensive and substantive legislative require-
ments would not be appropriate; local officials alone have sufficient
familiarity with local land use problems to make most substantive
decisions. But a statute must establish parameters for the local
exercise of discretion.
Legislation that would maintain municipal discretion while pre-
venting abuses harming the region would require that a municipality
consider the regional impact of a proposed zoning ordinance in its
decisionmaking process. The proposed statute might be modeled
on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)136 which
requires that federal agencies include significant environmental con-
siderations in determining whether and how to implement any project.
An acceptable environmental impact statement is proof of this con-
sideration. Zoning officials could submit a zoning impact statement
to the state for the public record. Such a plan would guarantee
some consideration of regional implications by local authorities
and would alert concerned parties, both public and private, to the
proposed ordinance. 37 This legislation would require only that the
135. Placing the decision-making power in a regional body would have some
advantages-more uniformity, less parochialism, less duplication of services and ex-
penditures-but these gains would come at the high cost of local expertise. Neither
extreme-complete local control or complete external control-appears to be a suitable
solution.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1970).
137. California has already adopted this approach. Under the California En-
vironmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE, §§ 21000-21151 (West 1970),
a municipality is required to consider the environmental impact of a zoning decision
in making that decision. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d
247, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). The Supreme Court of California held
that the EQA, modeled on NEPA, required the filing of an environmental impact
report for the issuance of a conditional use or building permit. The court avoided
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decisionmaker follow a procedure which includes specific factors in
reaching a conclusion. The statute would not compel any substan-
tive result. The municipality retains the power to make its own land
use decisions, while its ability to harm neighboring communities
and the region as a whole is reduced.
X. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit has chosen to allow municipalities to regulate
land use patterns without requiring that regional needs and re-
sources be considered in the decision process. By applying a test
similar to the Ramapo test and emphasizing judicial deference to
local legislative authorities, the court of appeals has rejected the
more innovative analysis used by the district court and has encour-
aged local decisionmakers to zone in an insular and parochial man-
ner. It is unwise, however, for courts to rely on local officials to
integrate regional considerations into the zoning process because
in the absence of legislative action, only a court enforced standard
of regional consciousness can prevent the abuse of local zoning dis-
cretion.
In allowing the Petaluma plan to stand, the Ninth Circuit has
ignored or rejected a number of alternative solutions which would
have maximized housing opportunities while maintaining a high
degree of local control over land development. The court's failure
to employ any of these alternatives returns the state of zoning case
law to where it stood immediately after Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. Under this model zoning ordinances may be used not
to solve problems common to the communities in a region but to
create new problems.
The court of appeals declined to analyze the long term impact
of the Petaluma plan on the San Francisco metropolitan area. Instead,
it limited its analysis to determining whether the city had the power,
under the enabling legislation, to promulgate the plan. Courts must
look beyond procedural conformity with enabling legislation and de-
termine the effects of a challenged zoning plan to decide whether
the plan serves the general welfare. The combined effect of defer-
ence to local zoning bodies in which all interested and affected
parties are not represented, exclusive focus on procedural conform-
ity, and presumption of validity of municipal zoning laws is to make
a sham of any efforts to challenge zoning legislation.
In choosing the Ramapo approach over the analysis of the district
court in Petaluma, the Ninth Circuit abdicated its responsibility
and adapted old solutions to new problems. It is no answer to say,
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as the Ninth Circuit did, that a federal court is not a "super legis-
lature nor a zoning board of appeal."1 38  Federal courts have long
protected the rights of individuals from local action when legislative
bodies have abdicated their responsibilities. "National respect for
the courts is more enhanced through the forthright enforcement of
those rights rather than by rendering them nugatory through the in-
terposition of subterfuges. 139 It remains for other courts to adopt a
broader, more enlightened perception of the nature of land use
problems and to solve the problems in a manner which will serve
the interests of a maximum number of the interested parties.
HOWARD ALLEN WEINER
the problem of the private nature of the proposed project by finding substantial state
involvement in the zoning and permit process. See Aloi, supra note 125, at 162.
138. 522 F.2d at 906.
139. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 262 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
